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Attorney General & another v Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists [2012] eKLR

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
AT NAIROBI
(CORAM: O’KUBASU, GITHINJI & ONYANGO OTIENO, JJ.A.)
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. NAI. 275 OF 2011 (UR. 179/2011)
BETWEEN
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ……………………………… 1ST APPLICANT
MINISTER OF STATE FOR PROVINCIAL
ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNAL SECURITY ……. 2ND APPLICANT
AND
THE KENYAN SECTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS …...……. RESPONDENT
(Application for stay of proceedings and execution of the Ruling of the High Court of Kenya at
Nairobi (Ombija, J.) dated 28th November, 2011
in
H.C.MISC.CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 685 OF 2010
*************************
RULING OF THE COURT
On 20th December, 2011, this application by way of Notice of Motion dated 6th December, 2011 was
placed before us for determination. The application was stated to have been brought under Rule 5(2)(b)
and 47 of the Court of Appeal Rules. In the motion, the two applicants (The Attorney General – 1st
applicant and Minister of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security – 2nd applicant) sought
the following orders:“1.
That there be an interim order of stay of execution of the ruling pending hearing and
determination of this application.
2. That pending the lodging, hearing and determination of the intended appeal herein there be
a stay of execution of the ruling delivered by the Superior Court (Hon. Mr. Justice R.N.O. Ombija
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on 28th November, 2011 in Nairobi HCC Misc. Appl.No. 685 of 2010)
3.
That pending the lodging, hearing and determination of intended appeal herein, there be a
stay of proceedings in Nairobi HCC Misc. Appl. No. 685 of 2010 pursuant to the ruling delivered
by Hon. Mr. Justice N.R.O. Ombija dated 28th November, 2011.”
The application which was supported by the affidavit of Mr. Thuita Mwangi, the Permanent
Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was brought on the following grounds:1. The Applicants’ appeal is arguable, not frivolous and has high chances of success on the
following grounds namely:i. The learned Judge misinterpreted the role of the High Court vis a vis the International Criminal
Court in applying Article 2(6) of the Constitution of Kenya and the International Crimes Act.
ii. The application before the Judge of the Superior Court was not a proper case for application of
International Customary Law; and universal jurisdiction.
iii. The Learned Judge failed to appreciate that the immunity of a serving Head of State is
guaranteed under the general rules of International Law which are part of our laws by virtue of
Article 2(5) of the Constitution, whereas Article 2(6) qualifies any Treaties to ratification before
becoming part of the laws of Kenya.
iv. That whilst the Learned Judge was correct in finding that no one is immune from International
Court Jurisdiction under Article 27, he failed to consider provisions of the Rome Statute relating
to immunity from execution in respect of sitting Heads of State preserved under Article 98 of the
Rome Statute hence his ultimate finding was wrong.
v. It is not evident on what provision of Kenyan law the Learned Judge invoked the jurisdiction of
the court to issue the provisional warrant of arrest to the extent that Articles 2(5), 2(6) of the
Constitution only regulate the relationship between International Law (customs and Treaty law)
and National Law.
vi. The learned Judge by accepting that the Court had jurisdiction in the absence of invocation of
any specific provision of the Constitution or statute, he assumed the role of an International
Criminal Court Judge, which is an improper conflation of Kenyan Law and International Law
(Rome Statute).
vii. By allowing the Applicants locus to present the application for a provisional arrest warrant the
Learned Judge misapplied the provisions of section 32 and 29 of the International Crimes Act
which state that only the Minister can present the application.
viii. That by not considering Article 98 the Judge disregarded delicate issues of immunity of a sitting
Head of State; he failed to consider the provisions of our law; The Privileges and Immunities Act
and first schedule to the Act Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.
ix. The issues before the court were not justiciable as they involved the Political question doctrine or
the Act of State Doctrine which question the court is not the best forum to address.
2. The Applicants are apprehensive that should the stay of execution and proceedings
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sought not be granted the relationship between Kenya (sic) will irretrievably break down.
3. The matter is of great public importance.
4. There are serious questions of applicability and interpretation of international law for
determination by the court at hearing of the appeal.”
Before the commencement of the hearing of application, Mr. Nderitu, the learned counsel for the
respondent, the Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists, raised a preliminary objection
to the application. It was that preliminary objection that was heard on that day – 20th December, 2011.
This ruling relates to that preliminary objection.
It was Mr. Nderitu’s submission that the proceedings relating to this application and by extension
the intended appeal were by their nature criminal proceedings. It was further submitted that the order
sought relates to a warrant of arrest. Mr. Nderitu drew our attention to the fact that this application was
brought under Rule 5(2)(b) of this Court’s Rules which rule, in his view, has no application in Criminal
proceedings. For that reason, Mr. Nderitu was of the view that the application was incompetent.
The second limb of Mr. Nderitu’s submissions was that after the establishment of the offices of the
Attorney General and Director of Public Prosecutions, it is only the Director of Public Prosecutions who
can file a notice to appear and make an application of this nature.
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Nderitu concluded his submissions by stating that the application is
void ab initio and should be struck out.
In response to the foregoing, Ms. Kimani, the learned counsel appearing for both respondents
submitted that in the High Court proceedings both respondents were named as such and they
responded to the summons. Ms Kimani pointed out that the Attorney General and the Minister, were not
accused persons or suspects. It was further submitted that the Attorney-General was entitled to appear
as a named respondent and principal adviser to the national government. Ms. Kimani therefore asked
us to reject the preliminary objection.
Mr. Kibe Mungai who appeared for an interested party addressed the court for a considerable time
in opposing the preliminary objection. He more or less adopted the submissions of Ms. Kimani but went
on to argue that the proceedings were neither criminal nor civil. It was Mr. Mungai’s further submission
that Article 258 of the Constitution relates to enforcement of the Constitution and that proceedings for
enforcement are neither criminal nor civil. Finally, Mr. Mungai submitted that if the preliminary objection
is upheld, then it would mean that a serious wrong would remain unaddressed for a considerable period.
The main point raised in this preliminary objection relates to the role of the Attorney General in
these proceedings. It was Mr. Nderitu’s submission that as these are criminal proceedings then under
the Constitution the respondent should have been the Director of Public Prosecutions and not the
Attorney General. Our simple answer to that contention is that in the High Court it was the applicant who
named the Attorney General as a respondent and the Attorney General responded to the Summons
accordingly. It is therefore rather interesting that the same applicant should be objecting to the
participation of the Attorney-General in this matter. The subject matter in these proceedings is a warrant
of arrest in respect of President Omar Ahmed Hassan Al Bashir (Omar Al Bashir). The respondents,
as correctly pointed out by both Ms. Kimani and Mr. Mungai are neither accused persons nor suspects.
The proceedings are in respect of the enforcement of the warrant of arrest by the Minister of State for
Provincial Administration and Internal Security. Apart from being named as the 1st respondent, the
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Attorney General is the principal legal adviser to the Government of Kenya.
Article 156(4)(a)(b) of the Constitution of Kenya provides:“(4) The Attorney-Generala. is the principal legal adviser to the Government;
b. shall represent the national government in court or in any other legal proceedings to which the
national government is a party, other than criminal proceedings.”
In view of the foregoing, we are satisfied that the Attorney General is a proper party to these proceedings
and we accordingly find no merit in the preliminary objection. As the proceedings are neither Criminal
nor Civil, we see no wrong in bringing the application under Rule 5(2)(b). We therefore dismiss the
objection.
Dated and delivered at NAIROBI this 17th day of February, 2012.
E.O. O’KUBASU
………………..
JUDGE OF APPEAL
E.M. GITHINJI
…………………
JUDGE OF APPEAL
J.W. ONYANGO OTIENO
…………………..
JUDGE OF APPEAL
I certify that this is
a true copy of the original.
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